If one examines the framework agreement signed in Washington through the headlines, it might seem like a historic breakthrough toward a peace deal between Israel and Lebanon. But a close reading of the document and its implementation mechanisms shows it is something entirely different. This is not a peace agreement but rather an American attempt to create a new security reality in southern Lebanon - in the hope that it will eventually become a political reality as well.

The agreement's main achievement is not that it brings peace but that it shifts the starting point. For the first time, Israel and Lebanon are publicly signing a joint document under American auspices that addresses neighborly relations, sovereignty and even future peace. The fact that the signing took place openly in Washington, rather than in a secret meeting or a tent in Naqoura, signals a deeper change than any technical clause in the agreement.

Yet the gap between the declarations and the reality on the ground remains vast. The entire agreement rests on one basic assumption: that the Lebanese army will succeed in doing what it has failed to do for decades - disarming Hezbollah and restoring the state's monopoly on force. This is also the agreement's weak point.

Hezbollah is not a party to the document at all. It did not participate in the negotiations, rejected the agreement immediately after the signing and even warned that any attempt to impose disarmament on it could spark a civil war in Lebanon. In other words, the body that holds most of the military power in southern Lebanon is not bound by the agreement.

Even if the Lebanese government wants to fulfill the commitments it has taken upon itself, it remains unclear whether it has the political and military capacity to do so. Significant segments of the Shiite population view Hezbollah as the "protector of Lebanon," and some criticism in Israel and the West also concerns whether elements within the Lebanese army itself are affiliated with the terrorist organization.

One of the main differences from previous agreements is the American involvement. In Resolution 1701 and prior cease-fire agreements, there was broad international involvement - yet enforcement mechanisms proved toothless. This time the United States is building its own oversight mechanism, with close accompaniment from the American security establishment, and seeks to ensure that every Israeli withdrawal is tied to tangible progress by the Lebanese army.

Another important change is the American commitment to provide Lebanon with 130 million dollars in economic aid, of which 100 million dollars is humanitarian assistance and 30 million dollars is to strengthen the army. This does not include training support. It is a meaningful shift, but it is no guarantee of success. The Americans can monitor, mediate and apply diplomatic and economic pressure - but they cannot disarm Hezbollah themselves.

For Israel, the central achievement is the change in the formula. In the past, pressure was applied on it to withdraw from southern Lebanon according to predetermined timelines. This time the opposite principle was set. Withdrawal is not automatic but conditional on dismantling the security threat. As long as Hezbollah remains armed, Israel may stay in the security zone. For Jerusalem, this is a significant diplomatic achievement because it establishes for the first time international recognition that the Israeli presence is directly linked to the security threat and not to territorial ambitions.

At the same time, Israel also pays a price. The IDF's freedom of action is not absolute. The agreement allows self-defense and responses to threats but does not grant freedom to launch large-scale operations. This means every Israeli action will also be subject to American considerations, especially given Washington's efforts to prevent regional escalation and maintain dialogue channels with Iran.

Diplomatically, one of the agreement's most prominent messages is directed at Tehran. The document states that Lebanon is a sovereign state and that the Lebanese government is the sole authorized body to use force in its territory. In doing so, it denies, at least on a declarative level, Hezbollah's legitimacy to operate as a "parallel army" in Lebanon's name. If implemented, this would be a strategic blow to the model Iran has built over decades. If not, it could remain a declaration only.

In the end, this agreement will not be judged by the images from the signing ceremony or the number of times the word "peace" appears in it. It will be tested by much simpler questions: Will Lebanese army soldiers actually deploy in the designated areas? Will Hezbollah agree to vacate them? Will Israel begin gradual withdrawals? And above all - will southern Lebanon be free of Hezbollah's military presence in a year or two? Until then, it is mainly an agreement that outlines a goal rather than guarantees the path to it.

In this sense, the framework agreement is an important diplomatic achievement for Israel, the United States and Lebanon, but it is not yet a security achievement. Its success depends on one actor that did not sign it at all - Hezbollah. As long as the organization does not accept the new rules of the game, the document signed in Washington is mainly an ambitious framework whose success will rise or fall on the reality on the ground.